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I. INTRODUCTION
Inventors of new, useful, and nonobvious products and processes
may obtain United States patent protection for their inventions.,
Armed with patents, inventors have the exclusive right to make, use,
or sell their inventions, or to perform their processes within the terri-
tory of the United States. According to section 271(a) of the Patent
Act, with limited exceptions, "whoever without authority makes, uses
or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the
term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent. '" 2
Perceiving a possible geographical limitation in the territorial
reach of United States patents, would-be infringers perform patented
processes outside the United States and import the resulting products
domestically, thus infringing patented processes without penalty. Un-
til recently, United States process patent holders could only hope to
exclude infringing importations from entering the United States.3
The Process Patent Amendments Act of 19884 ("Process Patent
* B.A., cum laude, Bradley University, 1983; J.D., with distinction, The John Marshall
Law School, 1986; LL.M. in Trade Regulation, New York University School of Law, 1991.
1. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Section 101 of the Patent Act provides: "Who-
ever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to
the conditions and requirements [of the Patent Act]." Id.
2. Id. § 271(a) (1988) (emphasis added); see also id. § 154 (1988) (contents and terms of
a patent).
3. See infra notes 40-99 and accompanying text.
4. Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 9001-9007, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 1107, 1563-67
(codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271, 287, 295); see also Glenn E.J. Murphy, Comment, The
Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988, 9 J.L. & COM. 267 (1989).
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Act"), enacted as part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988,5 remedied this situation by expanding the rights of pro-
cess patent holders. This new law enables process patentees to "ex-
clude others from using or selling throughout the United States, or
importing into the United States, products made by that [patented]
process."' 6 The Process Patent Act also creates a judicial cause of ac-
tion for process patent infringement. This new cause of action pro-
vides monetary damages to process patent holders for the
importation, sale, or use of infringing products manufactured abroad
through processes protected by United States patents.7 In theory, the
expansive reach of the Process Patent Act effectively affords process
patent holders protection beyond the borders of the United States.
Thus, since 1989, would-be patent infringers have been prohibited
from performing patented processes in both the United States and
abroad when intended for importation into the United States. 8
This Article begins with a brief discussion of the types of
processes eligible for patent protection. 9 Next, it evaluates the reme-
dies available for process patent infringements. In particular, this Ar-
ticle compares the merits of the new in personam judicial proceedings
available for process patent infringements under the Process Patent
Act with in rem exclusion orders available through the United States
International Trade Commission under the Tariff Act of 1930.10 This
Article then provides a brief overview of the Process Patent Act, and
analyzes issues of statutory construction raised in the first two years
of its existence. The 1991 federal district court case of Allegheny Lud-
5. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 1107 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 19 and 35 U.S.C.); see also PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, THE NEW TRADE LAW:
OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1988 (1988); Terry L. Clark, The Future of
Patent-Based Investigations Under Section 337 After the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1149, 1156 (1989); Mark Modak-Truran, Comment, Section
337 and GA 7T in the Akzo Controversy: A Pre- and Post-Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act Analysis, 22 INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 189, 192 (1990).
6. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act § 9002, 102 Stat. 1107, 1563 (1988)
(amending 35 U.S.C. § 154).
7. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (1988).
8. The Process Patent Act entered into effect on February 23, 1989. See Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act § 9006; Bristol-Myers Co. v. Erbamont Inc., 723 F. Supp. 1038, 1039
n.6 (D. Del. 1989), dismissed, 734 F. Supp. 661 (D. Del), and aff'd without opinion, 918 F.2d
186 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
9. See infra notes 14-39 and accompanying text.




lum Corp. v. Nippon Steel Corp.I raises questions as to whether the
Process Patent Act, enacted in the context of comprehensive amend-
ments to the customs laws of the United States, may be interpreted
without reference to the customs laws.' 2 Finally, this Article identi-
fies a new, expanded liability of importers, who face unexpected perils
for "importing" infringing items, even when the "imported" mer-
chandise never enters United States customs territory, and suggests
that, for purposes of United States patent law, "importation" should




As defined by the Patent Act, the term "process" refers to "pro-
cess, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process,
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material."' 4 The
United States Supreme Court interprets a process as "an act, or a
series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter or to be transformed
and reduced to a different state or thing."' 15 Therefore, "process" is
equivalent to a "method,"' 16 and a "process patent" is a "patent on the
way an item is produced.'
7
Because the United States Patent and Trademark Office grants
patents based on how an item is produced, the ultimate product need
not be something new, useful, or nonobvious. If the product is new,
useful, and nonobvious, however, the inventor may secure a patent on
both the inventive process and the ultimate invention.' 8 Thus, pat-
ented processes may be "either a way of getting to something inven-
11. 765 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Pa. 1991), reconsideration granted in part, denied in part, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2821 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
12. See infra notes 106-38 and accompanying text. The problem may be one of federal
district court insulation from customs laws that, at the trial court level, are within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the United States Court of International Trade.
13. See infra notes 139-83 and accompanying text.
14. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1988).
15. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 182-84 (1980) (quoting Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 787-88); Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324
U.S. 726, 744 (1945). A "process" has also been defined as a "means to an end." ARTHUR R.
MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND
COPYRIGHT IN A NUTSHELL 21 (2d ed. 1990).
16. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 965 (Fed. Cir.), vacated sub nom. Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028, and aff'd, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
17. U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, Patent Surveys, Process Patents and Exclusion Orders, in
CUSTOMS DIRECTIVE 2300-06 1 (Nov. 21, 1989).
18. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-104 (1988).
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tive or they may be an inventive way of getting to something already
known."' 19 It is important to note, however, that processes, like ma-
chines, manufactures, and compositions of matter, are subject to the
general rules of patentability.20 Accordingly, to secure a process pat-
ent, the process must be a new, useful, and nonobvious way of doing
something,21 and must be more specific than "the very idea of how to
do something."
'22
Chemical processes are a common subject of process patents.
23
Inventors of new drugs created from chemical processes often seek to
patent not only the drugs themselves, but the way in which they are
produced, in order to secure "double" patent protection. 24 This is
important because, if later proceedings determine that a patented
drug is an obvious derivative of an earlier medication, the patent on
the drug will be held invalid. 25 However, if the inventor also patented
the chemical process that led to the drug's creation, the patent cover-
ing the inventive process may still provide substantial protection.
26
If a process is particularly abstract, however, it may not be pat-
19. MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 15, at 21.
20. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974).
21. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-04; MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 15, at 24.
22. MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 15, at 25. Professors Miller and Davis explain process
patents with the example of pressing pants:
If a pants-presser, for instance, were claimed as new, the idea of pressing pants obvi-
ously could not be patented. A particular way of inserting creases, however, might
be patentable because, as a way of producing creases, the patent would cover the
process and not the very idea of creases.
Thus, the patentability of the result or product of a process is not relevant to the
patentability of the process. Clearly, pressed pants, the product of the process, could
not be patented. Pressed pants, though useful, are neither novel nor nonobvious.
But an ingenious way of producing creases certainly might qualify if it were novel,
useful, and nonobvious.
Id.
23. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 902 F.2d 1532 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (patent contained claims directed toward recombinant DNA sequences, vectors, and
host cells used to produce recombinant erythropoietin); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Erbamont Inc.,
723 F. Supp. 1038 (D. Del. 1989), dismissed, 734 F. Supp. 661 (D. Del.), and aff'd without
opinion, 918 F.2d 186 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (process to prepare doxorubicin, a well-known drug
used in the chemotherapeutic treatment of cancer).
24. See, e.g., In re Pleuddemann, 910 F.2d 823, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1990); MILLER & DAVIS,
supra note 15, at 25.
25. See 35 U.S.C. § 103. According to 35 U.S.C. § 103:
A patent may not be obtained... if the differences between the subject matter sought
to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Id.
26. MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 15, at 25-26.
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entable. 27 For example, in Gottschalk v. Benson,28 the United States
Supreme Court held that an abstract mathematical process of con-
verting information from binary-coded numbers to digital numbers
was unpatentable. 29 Further, abstract processes may be barred from
patentability if they are too similar to non-patentable subject matters,
such as mental steps, business methods, laws or principles of nature,
or ideas.30 In addition, just as naturally occurring products are not
patentable, "a process may not be patentable because, although the
inventor was the first to articulate the methodology, it is so basic as to
be held, in a sense, naturally occurring."'31 That is, a formula, pro-
gram, or method may be deemed to be "out there all along, just like a
mineral in the earth that the inventor merely found but did not
invent." 32
However, a process is not unpatentable simply because it in-
cludes a law of nature or a mathematical algorithm. 3a As the
Supreme Court stated in Diamond v. Diehr,34 "an application of a law
of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process
may well be deserving of patent protection. ' 35 Nonetheless, a clear
distinction does not always exist between patentable processes and un-
patentable principles.
36
Prior to the Process Patent Act, courts found that, once a patent
issues on the inventive process, the patent holder's power extends only
to those products made by the patented process. 37 Therefore, a pro-
cess patent left the field "open to ingenious men [and women] to in-
27. Id. at 26.
28. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
29. Id.; see MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 15, at 26; Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited:
The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer-Related Inventions, 39
EMORY L.J. 1025 (1990).
30. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981); In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 837
(Fed. Cir. 1989); Application of Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330, 1335-36 (C.C.P.A. 1978); Application
of Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 157 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Dan v. Noll, 434 U.S.
875 (1977); MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 15, at 26.
31. MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 15, at 26.
32. Id.
33. Diamond, 450 U.S. at 187-88; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978); In re Grams,
888 F.2d at 838; see also Claim with Algorithm is Unpatentable Under § 101, 39 PAT. TRADE-
MARK & COPYRIGHT J. 23 (BNA) (Nov. 9, 1989).
34. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
35. Id. at 187-88.
36. Parker, 437 U.S. at 589.
37. See, e.g., United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, G.m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1127
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568 (1876)).
1992]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
vent and to employ other processes. '" 8 This principle led courts to
find that the "sale of a product made by a patented process does not
itself infringe the patent; it is the unauthorized use of the process that
infringes the patent. '3
9
III. REMEDIES FOR PROCESS PATENT INFRINGEMENTS
A. Introduction
1. Pre-1988 Remedies for Process Patent Infringements
Prior to the Process Patent Act, a process patent holder could
seek infringement relief only through an import exclusion order is-
sued by the United States International Trade Commission ("ITC").40
Process patents had been protected by former section 337a of the
Tariff Act of 1930, which the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988 repealed.4 1 Prior to the Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act, section 337a declared that imported goods made by a pro-
cess patented in the United States would be treated as if a United
States product patent existed for the resulting product.4 2 Thus, a
United States process patent holder could block the importation and
sale of goods made abroad by its patented process, even though the
patent holder could cite to no actual "infringement" of its process
patent under United States law.
43
2. Post-1988 Remedies for Process Patent Infringements
Process patents are now protected under an amended section 337
of the Tariff Act of 1930.44 Section 337 allows the ITC to order the
United States Customs Service to exclude future importations of in-
38. Id. at 1122, 1127-28 (quoting ALBERT H. WALKER, PATENTS § 23, at 140 (2d ed.
1964)).
39. Id. (citing Koratron Co. v. Lion Uniform, Inc., 449 F.2d 337, 338 (9th Cir. 1971); In
re Amtorg Trading Corp., 75 F.2d 826 (C.C.P.A. 1935), cert. denied sub non. International
Agric. Corp. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 296 U.S. 576 (1935) (noting that former § 337a (now
19 U.S.C. § 337) subjects the importation of products covered by a United States process pat-
ent to the same administrative sanctions as products covered by a product patent)).
40. See, e.g., Wilbur L. Fugate, Antitrust Aspects of International Patent and Technology
Licensing, 5 J.L. & COM. 433, 441 (1985).
41. Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 76-515, 54 Stat. 724 (1930), amended by Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act § 1342(c); see also Amgen, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 902 F.2d 1532, 1540 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
42. Murphy, supra note 4, at 288-89.
43. Id. at 289 (citing James M. Johnstone, Impact of the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 on the Generic Industry--Business Considerations and
Potential Legal Issues, 40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 339, 343 (1985)).
44. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
212 [Vol. 14:207
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fringing products. 45 However, section 337 does not empower the ITC
to grant any monetary relief to United States process patent holders in
the event of infringement. 46
The new process patent protection law contained in section
271(g) of the Process Patent Act grants federal district courts the
power to award monetary damages to process patent holders in the
event an infringer imports, sells, or uses articles manufactured abroad
by a patented process.47 This judicial cause of action for process pat-
ent infringement is not intended to eliminate other available legal
remedies, 48 such as exclusion orders from the ITC under section 337
of the Tariff Act.49
B. Tariff Act Section 337 Administrative Proceedings Before the
United States International Trade Commission
Process patent rights are enforceable against imported products
through ITC administrative proceedings. Under the provisions of
section 337 of the Tariff Act, the ITC can issue exclusion orders for
merchandise imported through unfair trade practices, 50 for infringe-
ments of product and process patents, 51 and for violations of other
intellectual property rights, including trademark,5 2 copyright,5 3 and
45. Id. § 1337(d). Section 1337(d) provides:
If the [ITC] determines... that there is a violation of this section, it shall direct that
the articles concerned, imported by any person violating the provision of this section,
be excluded from entry into the United States, unless ... it finds that such articles
should not be excluded from entry.
Id.
46. Id. § 1337.
47. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(g), 284 (1988). According to section 271(g), "Whoever without
authority imports into the United States or sells or uses within the United States a product
which is made by a process patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer ...."
Id. § 271(g). Further, according to section 284, "Upon finding for the claimant the court shall
award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less
than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with
interest and costs as fixed by the court." Id. § 284.
48. The Process Patent Act provides that the Act "shall not deprive a patent owner of
any remedies available under subsections (a) through (f) of section 271 of title 35, United
States Code, under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, or under any other provision of law."
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act § 9006(c); see also U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, supra
note 17, at 2.
49. 19 U.S.C. § 1337.
50. Id. § 1337(a)(1)(A). Section 1337(a)(1)(A) prohibits "unfair methods of competition
and unfair acts in the importation of articles... into the United States." Id.
51. Id. § 1337(a)(l)(B). Section 1337(a)(1)(B) prohibits "[t]he importation into the
United States ... of articles that ... are made, produced, processed, or mined under, or by
means of, a process covered by the claims of a valid and enforceable United States patent." Id.
52. Id. § 1337(a)(1)(C). Section 1337(a)(1)(C) prohibits "[t]he importation into the
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mask work registrations. 54 Although the Tariff Act also addresses al-
leged violations of "trade secrets" not otherwise protectable under
federal law, 55 section 337 is most often invoked to enforce patent
rights.56 Administrative proceedings under section 337 are in rem, 57
and the ITC confiscates all infringing articles.
58
1. Scope of Section 337
Section 337 of the Tariff Act prohibits unfair methods of compe-
tition in the importation or sale of articles if the effect of such meth-
ods destroys, substantially injures, or prevents the establishment of an
efficient and economical United States industry, or restrains or mono-
polizes trade and commerce in the United States.59 Further, section
337 prohibits the importation, sale for importation, and sale within
the United States after importation of articles that either infringe a
valid and enforceable United States patent or copyright or "are made,
United States ...of articles that infringe a valid and enforceable United States trademark
registered under the Trademark Act of 1946." Id.; see also William M. Borchard, Trademark
Piracy at Home and Abroad, WALL ST. J., May 7, 1991, at A22. Further, a Senate Bill was
introduced on April 23, 1991, to prohibit the importation or sale within the United States of
goods manufactured outside the United States bearing a trademark that is identical or confus-
ingly similar to a United States registered trademark owned by, or exclusively licensed to, a
citizen, corporation, or other entity created in the United States, unless the owner or exclusive
licensee consents to the sale or importation. See S. 894, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
53. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(D). Section 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) protects against articles that in-
fringe "a valid and enforceable United States copyright registered under title 17" of the United
States Code. Id. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i).
54. Id. § 1337(a)(1)(D). Section 1337(a)(l)(D) prohibits "[t]he importation into the
United States... of a semiconductor chip product in a manner that constitutes infringement of
a mask work registered under chapter 9 of title 17" of the United States Code. Id.; see also
U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, U.S. CUSTOMS PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
(1989).
Mask works are electronic circuitry products, such as integrated circuits and semiconduc-
tor chips. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-904 (1988); 19 C.F.R. § 12.39(d) (1990); Charles R. McManis,
International Protection for Semiconductor Chip Designs and the Standard of Judicial Review of
Presidential Proclamations Issued Pursuant to the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984,
22 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 331, 343 (1988).
55. U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, supra note 54.
56. See 3 HAROLD I. LORING, MICHAEL P. MAXWELL & MARK E. WOJCIK, Interna-
tional Trade, in NEW YORK PRACTICE GUIDE: BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL § 22.16(4)(a)
(1991); see also Clark, supra note 5, at 1156; Modak-Truran, supra note 5, at 192.
57. "In rem" is "[a] technical term used to designate proceedings or actions instituted
against the thing, in contradistinction to personal actions, which are said to be in personam."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 793-94 (6th ed. 1990).
58. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)-(g).
59. Id. § 1337(a)(l)(A); 19 C.F.R. § 12.39(a); see generally DONALD K. DUVALL, FED-
ERAL UNFAIR COMPETITION ACTIONS: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE UNDER SECTION 337 OF
THE TARIFF ACT OF 1930 (1990).
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produced, processed, or mined under, or by means of, a process cov-
ered by the claims of a valid and enforceable United States patent." °
This section 337 exclusion for process patents is available only if
an industry in the United States "relating to the articles protected by
the patent . . . exists or is in the process of being established.' '6 An
industry "exists" if there is a significant United States investment in
plants and equipment, significant employment of United States labor
or capital, or a substantial United States investment in the exploita-
tion of the patent, including engineering, research and development,
and licensing.
62
2. Procedures of Section 337
When the ITC receives a proper complaint of process patent in-
fringement under section 337, an administrative law judge holds a
preliminary hearing to determine whether the imported articles vio-
late the process patent. 63 After this initial determination, the ITC
may adopt the administrative law judge's report, in whole or in part,
64
or it may determine, irrespective of the administrative law judge's re-
port, that a possible violation of section 337 exists.65 In either case,
the ITC's determination takes effect the day it is published in the Fed-
eral Register.
66
The ITC then sends its determination to the United States presi-
dent, who has sixty days to reject it for policy reasons.67 If the presi-
dent rejects the ITC's determination, the process patent holder and
alleged infringer are not entitled to appeal, and the investigation
ends.68 If the president does not reject the determination during the
sixty-day period, the determination is final and appealable the day fol-
lowing the close of the period.69 The determination may be effective
60. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B); see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
61. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2).
62. Id. § 1337(a)(3).
63. 19 C.F.R. §§ 210.41, 210.53 (1990); Clark, supra note 5, at 1155.
64. 19 C.F.R. § 12.39(a); Clark, supra note 5, at 1155.
65. 19 C.F.R. §§ 12.39(a), 210.56 (1990); LORING ET AL., supra note 56, at 22-197;
Clark, supra note 5, at 1155.
66. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(j)(1)(A), 1337(j)(3); 19 C.F.R. § 12.39(a); H.R. REP. No. 576,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 639 (1986), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1672; LORING ET AL.,
supra note 56, at 22-197.
67. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j); 19 C.F.R. § 12.39(a); DUVALL, supra note 59, at 460-73.
68. Duracell, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 778 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
Clark, supra note 5, at 1155.
69. 19 C.F.R. § 12.39(a); LORING ET AL., supra note 56, at 22-197 to 22-198; Clark,
supra note 5, at 1155.
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earlier if the president notifies the ITC of his approval before the close
of the sixty-day period.70 Once the ITC's determination is final, the
United States Customs Service will deny entry to all merchandise cov-
ered by an ITC exclusion order, or seize the merchandise subject to a
seizure order.
71
3. International Trade Commission Orders
The types of orders available from the ITC include (1) orders to
cease and desist; (2) orders for temporary exclusion; and (3) orders for
permanent exclusion.72 The penalty for violation of an ITC cease and
desist order has increased from $10,000 or the value of the excluded
goods to $100,000 or twice the value of the excluded goods. 73 In addi-
tion, an ITC exclusion order, such as that concerning crystalline
cefadroxil monohydrate, 74 can be a general exclusion of all infringing
products or a limited exclusion of products from only certain import-
ers.75 Limited exclusion orders may result in patent holders expend-
ing a great deal of time and money embroiled in section 337 litigation
before the ITC, but achieving only phyrric victories against a single
infringing importer.
Litigants may appeal final ITC exclusion orders directly to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 76 and ulti-
mately, by writ of certiorari, to the United States Supreme Court.77
In contrast to ITC determinations for other international trade laws,7 8
process patent exclusion orders are not subject to intervening appeal
70. 19 C.F.R. § 12.39(a); LORING ET AL., supra note 56, at 22-198; Clark, supra note 5,
at 1155.
71. 19 C.F.R. § 12.39(b); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 639 (1987),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1672; U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, supra note 17, at 3.
72. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(0; JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE 8-
349 (1989); LORING ET AL., supra note 56, at 22-198.
73. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(0(2); Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act § 1342(a)(4)(B);
Murphy, supra note 4, at 291-92.
74. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Commission Opinion on the Issue Under Review, and on
Remedy, the Public Interest, and Bonding, Inv. No. 337-TA-293, at 25 (Mar. 1990).
75. LORING ET AL., supra note 56, at 22-198.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6) (1988); DUVALL, supra note 59, at 476; Clark, supra note 5, at
1155.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1988); Clark, supra note 5, at 1155.
78. The ITC also makes "material injury" determinations in antidumping and counter-
vailing duty proceedings. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman & Mark E. Wojcik, Computer
Software as Articles of Commerce in International Trade: The Surprising Study of Singapore's
Software Subsidies, 4 SoFrWARE L.J. 301 (1991); William B.T. Mock, Jr., Cumulation of Im-
port Statistics in Injury Investigations Before the International Trade Commission, 7 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 433, 435-39 (1986).
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to the United States Court of International Trade. 79
If the ITC finds a violation of section 337, or has reason to be-
lieve that a violation may exist, the ITC may direct the United States
Customs Service to exclude from entry into the United States the arti-
cles imported by the violator or suspected violator.80 If the ITC so
directs, the exclusion order will remain in effect until the ITC deter-
mines that the conditions that led to the exclusion order no longer
exist, or until the president rejects the ITC's determination for policy
reasons.8
In some cases, "excluded" articles may be imported under bond
until the ITC's exclusion order is final.8 2 However, once the ITC's
order is final, the United States Customs Service will refuse entry to
all articles covered by the exclusion order.8 3 The only exception is for
articles imported by the federal government for its own use.84
C. Tariff Act Section 337 and the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade
While it may appear that section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930
effectively prohibits the importation of products found to infringe
valid United States patents, a dispute resolution panel, established
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade8 5 ("GATT"),
found that section 337 is inconsistent with the United States' obliga-
79. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1988); LORING ET AL., supra note 56, at 22-198.
80. Procedurally, United States Customs Headquarters will notify regional commission-
ers and area, district, and port directors of exclusion orders and bonding requirements. Head-
quarters will also notify the field when the exclusion order becomes final. Once an order is
final, the Customs Service's area or district directors will notify local enforcement offices of any
shipments of products covered by the exclusion order. The Customs Service will then provide
written notice to the importer of the denial of entry for its infringing products. The Customs
Service will also transmit a copy of this notice to the Office of Trade Operations at Customs
Headquarters. 19 C.F.R. § 12.39(b)(1); U.S. CusToMs SERVICE, supra note 17, at 3; LORING
ET AL., supra note 56, at 22-198 to 22-199.
81. 19 C.F.R. § 12.39(b)(1); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 637-38
(1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1670-71; LORING ET AL., supra note 56, at 22-
198 to 22-199.
82. LORING ET AL., supra note 56, at 22-199. The ITC establishes the amount of such
bonds. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e)(1); 19 C.F.R. § 12.39(b)(2).
83. 19 C.F.R. § 12.39(b)(2); LORING ET AL., supra note 56, at 22-199.
84. ITC exclusion orders do not apply to articles imported by and for the United States
government, nor to articles imported for the United States government with its authorization
or consent. 19 C.F.R. § 12.39(c); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 638 (1987),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1671; LORING ET AL., supra note 56, at 22-200.
85. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Technical Barriers to Trade, done Apr. 12,
1979, art. 14, § 14.13, 31 U.S.T. 405, 427, 1186 U.N.T.S. 276, 298.
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tions under the GATT.8 6 The GATT panel determined that ITC pro-
ceedings under section 337 discriminate against foreign goods, and
thus violate the GATT in four respects: (1) section 337 proceedings
in the ITC must proceed to termination under fixed time limits, while
infringement proceedings in the district courts have no such time lim-
its; (2) alleged infringers cannot raise counterclaims in section 337
proceedings, while counterclaims can be raised in district court pro-
ceedings; (3) United States patent holders may elect to proceed in a
district court or before the ITC, but there is no choice of forum for
enforcing United States patents against domestic products; and (4)
importers may have to defend their products simultaneously before
both the ITC and a federal district court.8 7
In response to the GATT panel report, the United States Trade
Representative ("USTR") proposed five methods of reforming patent
enforcement procedures under United States law. 8
86. LORING ET AL., supra note 56, at 22-198.
87. Committee on Patents, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Recommen-
dations Addressing Proposed Amendments to Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 46 RECORD
OF THE Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 149-50 (Mar. 1991) [hereinafter
Committee on Patents].
88. In Revisions to U.S. Patent Enforcement Procedures; Section 337: Request for Public
Comments, 55 Fed. Reg. 3503 (1990), the USTR proposed the following five reforms:
(1) Congress could create a specialized trial-level patent court empowered to hear
all patent-related litigation and amend section 337 to provide that patent-based com-
plaints be brought before the new court. Congress could grant this patent court the
authority to issue limited and general exclusion orders, temporary exclusion orders
(TEOs) and temporary cease and desist orders (TCDs). These authorities would be
in addition to the powers exercised by other Article III courts.
(2) Congress could create a new division of the U.S.C.I.T. [United States Court of
International Trade] which would have jurisdiction over section 337 patent-based
actions and collateral claims (patent litigation not involving imports would continue
to be heard in the district courts). The new division of the U.S.C.I.T. could have the
authority to issue limited and general exclusion orders, TEOs, and TCDs and exer-
cise all other Article III authorities. Rules would provide for consolidation of related
court actions such as declaratory judgments requests into a single proceeding.
(3) Congress could provide for transfer of patent-based section 337 cases to a spe-
cialized division of the U.S.C.I.T. or to designated [federal] district courts at the
request of the respondents in a section 337 action. Further amendments to section
337 could provide a procedure whereby the patent owner could obtain damages from
the court after [an ITC] patent-based section 337 proceeding, without a de novo
hearing by the court on patent infringement issues. Rules on consolidation of actions
would also be part of this approach.
(4) Congress could enact a variation on the transfer approach described above that
would permit transfer of a patent-based section 337 action to a court after the [ITC]
conducts a hearing on preliminary relief. The portion of the proceeding heard before
the United States International Trade Commission would be subject to statutory
deadlines and presidential review. Rules on obtaining damages and consolidation of
court actions would be the same as those described above.
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Various groups studied the USTR proposals, including the Com-
mittee on Patents of the New York City Bar Association ("Commit-
tee on Patents").8 9 The Committee on Patents recommended that the
GATT panel's objections be met by providing a mechanism by which
respondents could remove a section 337 proceeding from the ITC to a
federal district court of the complainant's choosing, either before or
after a determination with respect to preliminary relieff ° Upon trans-
fer, the federal district court should be empowered to grant tempo-
rary, permanent, and general exclusion orders. 91 The complainant
should also be allowed to withdraw a section 337 complaint and sub-
stitute a complaint that includes "the full panoply of remedies avail-
able to patentees. '92 The Committee on Patents urged Congress to
retain section 337 proceedings before the ITC, but to modify those
procedures the GATT panel found most objectionable to respon-
dents.93 The Committee on Patents specifically recommended enlarg-
ing the time limits for section 337 actions and empowering the ITC to
hear counterclaims related to the transactions under review.
94
The Committee on Patents noted that its proposal for the ITC to
consider counterclaims might raise constitutional issues, in light of
the United States Supreme Court decision in Northern Pipeline Con-
struction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.95 In Northern Pipeline Con-
struction Co., the Supreme Court invalidated a section of the
Bankruptcy Act requiring litigants involved in actions with bankrupt
parties to submit traditional state-law claims to a non-Article III tri-
bunal. 96 The Committee on Patents also perceived a potential consti-
tutional due process violation if Congress were to adopt its proposal
to provide district courts with the power to issue general exclusion
(5) Congress could amend section 337 to provide for transfer of patent-based sec-
tion 337 cases to court for a hearing on those issues that cannot be adjudicated by the
[ITC], e.g., damage claims and counterclaims. Transfer would occur after the
United States International Trade Commission determined whether there is a viola-
tion of section 337 in the importation of goods that infringe a valid and enforceable
U.S. patent and decided whether to issue a TEO or TCD order.
Id. at 3503-04.
89. The Section of Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law of the American Bar Associa-
tion also studied the USTR proposals. See SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND COPY-
RIGHT LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, 1990 SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 86-90 (1991).
90. Committee on Patents, supra note 87, at 150.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 150-51.
93. Id. at 159.
94. Id. at 159-60.
95. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
96. Id.; Committee on Patents, supra note 87, at 158.
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orders. 97 However, there is no constitutional right to import mer-
chandise into the United States.98
In sum, section 337 administrative proceedings before the ITC
are subject to future legislative amendments. The USTR and private
groups have proposed modifications to section 337,99 but the statute
remains unamended. In addition, it is unlikely that any eventual
amendment to section 337 will be retroactive, or that it will otherwise
affect investigations then pending before the ITC. Further, amend-
ments to section 337 may be subject to constitutional challenges. For
the foreseeable future, therefore, section 337 remains a viable tool for
process patent holders to protect their inventive processes from in-
fringing importations.
D. The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
Possible international protection for process patents may be
found within the framework of the Paris Convention for the Protec-
tion of Industrial Propertyo ° ("Paris Convention"), which provides
an international system of industrial property protection. 0 1 Approxi-
mately one hundred nations, including the United States, are mem-
bers of the Paris Convention. 102 The Stockholm revision of the Paris
Convention, to which the United States is bound, addresses the rights
of process patent holders as against importers of products manufac-
tured abroad through domestically-patented processes. 0 3 The rele-
vant provision of the Paris Convention, and its application to United
States process patents, is analyzed as follows:
Article 5 quater grants a process patentee of [a] member nation
equal rights under that nation's law as between domestically pro-
97. Committee on Patents, supra note 87, at 156-57.
98. See Ganadera Indus., S.A. v. Block, 727 F.2d 1156, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also
Arjay Assocs., Inc. v. Bush, 891 F.2d 894, 896-97 (Fed. Cir. 1989); American Ass'n of Export-
ers and Importers v. United States, 751 F.2d 1239, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
99. For a discussion of these proposed modifications, see supra notes 88-98 and accompa-
nying text.
100. International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 25
Stat. 1372, 161 T.S. 409, as revised at Brussels on Dec. 14, 1900, 32 Stat. 1936, 189 T.S. 134;
Washington on June 2, 1911, 38 Stat. 1645, 213 T.S. 405; the Hague Convention on Nov. 6,
1925, 47 Stat. 1789, 74 L.N.T.S. 289; London on June 2, 1934, 53 Stat. 1748, 192 L.N.T.S. 17;
Lisbon on Oct. 31, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 1, 828 U.N.T.S. 107; Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
101. Id.
102. Murphy, supra note 4, at 280-81 (citing 2J JOHN P. SINNOT, WORLD PATENT LAW




duced or imported products of the patented process. Thus, it ap-
pears that Article 5 quater extends the application of U.S. patent
law to infringing acts beyond the borders of the United States or its
territories. In 1927, a [f]ederal [d]istrict court held that patents are
within Congress' treaty-making power, that treaties involving pat-
ents controlled over prior inconsistent statutes, and that such trea-
ties were self-executing absent specific provisions for an executory
treaty. The Supreme Court confirmed that the Paris Convention is
self-executing and its provisions are immediately applicable by the
Patent Office or [federal courts. However, since the adoption of
Article 5 quater by the Senate in 1967, no [flederal court has ap-
plied its provisions in an infringement action. Thus, while it ap-
pears that [flederal courts would be willing to enforce Article 5
quater, no U.S. process patentees have opted to take that
chance. 104
Thus, while the Paris Convention may protect United States process
patent holders against infringing importations, its provisions remain
untested for process patent infringement litigation.
In addition to this untested protection, the Paris Convention of-
fer's a process by which nations, but not individuals or companies, can
appear before the International Court of Justice with any disputes
concerning the application or interpretation of the Paris
Convention. 105
E. The Process Patent Amendments Act
1. Overview of the Process Patent Amendments Act
Congress enacted the Process Patent Act to remedy a perceived
infirmity in then-existing United States patent law.1°6 Proponents of
the Process Patent Act claimed that the prior patent law inadequately
protected domestic process patent holders against harmful use of their
patented technology by foreign manufacturers.10 7 Process patent
holders claimed that technology piracy decreased competitiveness and
incentives to innovate by preventing recovery of research and devel-
opment costs ordinarily derived from an exclusive patent grant.'0 8
104. Id. at 281-82 (citations omitted).
105. Id. at 282.
106. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act §§ 9001-9007.
107. Murphy, supra note 4, at 267 (citing General Oversight Hearings on Patent and Trade-
mark Issues Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1987) (statement of Sen. DeConcini, Chairman)).
108. Id. (citing General Oversight Hearings on Patent and Trademark Issues Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
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Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L[JV
Because of their large capital investments in research and develop-
ment, pioneer drug companies strongly supported passage of the Pro-
cess Patent Act.1°9 However, the generic drug industry, which
imports significant amounts of foreign-produced pharmaceuticals in
bulk and finished forms, vigorously opposed the Process Patent Act
because its passage would terminate the flow of relatively inexpensive
products. 1 10
The Process Patent Act identifies an "infringer" as any unau-
thorized importer of a product made by a process patented in the
United States."' Under this Act, process patent holders may file
causes of action for monetary damages and injunctive relief in federal
district court, instead of in the United States Court of International
Trade or with the ITC.Il2 This new right of action is in addition to
any remedies otherwise available to process patent holders under
other provisions of law.1 3 Section 271(g) of the Process Patent Act
provides:
Whoever without authority imports into the United States or
sells or uses within the United States a product which is made by a
process patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer,
if the importation, sale, or use of the product occurs during the
term of such process patent.... In an action for infringement of a
process patent, no remedy may be granted for infringement on ac-
count of the noncommercial use or retail sale of a product unless
there is no adequate remedy under this title for infringement on
account of the importation or other use or sale of that product. A
product which is made by a patented process will, for purposes of
this title, not be considered to be so made after - (1) it is materi-
ally changed by subsequent processes; or (2) it becomes a trivial
and nonessential component of another product." 14
2. Statutory Construction of the Process Patent Amendments Act
The Process Patent Act, as summarized by the Eastern District
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 47-48 (1987) (statement of Donald W. Banner, President of Intellectual
Property Owners, Inc.)).
109. Id. (citing James M. Gould, Protecting Owners of U.S. Process Patents from the Im-
portation of Pharmaceuticals Made Abroad by Use of the Patent Process: Current Options, Pro-
posed Legislation, and a GAT7 Solution, 42 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 346, 347 (1987)).
110. Id. (citing 4 INT'L TRADE REP. 138 (BNA) (Feb. 4, 1987)).
111. U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, supra note 17, at 2.
112. Id.; LORING ET AL., supra note 56, at 22-196.
113. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
114. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (emphasis added).
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Court of Pennsylvania in Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. Nippon Steel
Corp. ,15 "allows United States process patent holders to sue foreign
companies who manufacture products using the process described in
the United States patent and then ship the goods for sale into the
United States."' 16 In spite of the court's statement, however, the stat-
ute does not limit potential defendants to foreign companies. Domes-
tic importers can also be sued under section 271(g).
The new provisions of the Process Patent Act implemented sev-
eral changes. First, the Process Patent Act grants patent holders the
right to prohibit the use, sale, or importation of products made by a
process patented in the United States. 117 Further, the statute defining
infringement now includes any unauthorized sale, use, or importation
of products resulting from United States patented processes."18
Second, the Process Patent Act provides that in an infringement
action based on such unauthorized importation, sale, or use, a "condi-
tional" presumption exists that the product was made by the patented
process.1 9 The presumption is conditional in that before it applies, a
court must determine that (1) a "substantial likelihood" exists that
the product was made by the patented process; and (2) the patent
holder made a reasonable effort to determine the actual process used
to manufacture the product. 120 If a court finds that both conditions
exist, the burden of establishing that the suspect product was not
made by the patented process "shall be on the party asserting that it
was not so made.' 21 While the proof necessary to sustain this burden
is readily available to foreign manufacturers and producers, it may be
elusive to importers, distributors, and export trading companies be-
cause foreign manufacturers may not be willing to disclose the meth-
ods used in their production processes.
Third, the Process Patent Act contains a "grandfather clause"
which provides that the new cause of action created by the Process
Patent Act does not apply to entities already engaged in "substantial
115. 765 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Pa. 1991), reconsideration granted in part, denied in part, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2821 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 1991).
116. Id. at 225 (emphasis added).
117. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act § 9002, revising 35 U.S.C. § 154; Murphy,
supra note 4, at 291.
118. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act § 9003, revising 35 U.S.C. § 271; Murphy,
supra note 4, at 291.
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and continuous sales of [a] product."'122 This clause was construed for
the first time in Allegheny Ludlum Corp., where Allegheny sued Nip-
pon Steel for process patent infringement under section 271(g) of the
Process Patent Act. 23 Allegheny accused Nippon of importing high-
permeability silicon steel manufactured in Japan by a process that al-
legedly infringed Allegheny's Patent 3,855,018 ('018 patent"). 24
Nippon moved for partial summary judgment, claiming that the
grandfather clause of the Process Patent Act protected Nippon from
its alleged infringement of Allegheny's '018 patent. 25 The Eastern
District Court of Pennsylvania denied Nippon's motion, holding that
the grandfather clause was "only to be used to protect domestic com-
panies and interests during the transition from enactment of the law to
the time that these companies were able to obtain new sources of the
product." 26
The court interpreted the legislative history of the Process Patent
Act to mean that "the target of the statute was the foreign manufac-
turer."' 27 The court pointed out that the original proposed Process
Patent Act would not have abridged or affected the rights of any en-
tity to continue to use, sell, or import any specific product "already in
substantial and continuous commercial production ... or for which
substantial preparation for production was made to the extent equita-
ble for the protection of investments made or business commenced
before that date."1 28 The court compared this early language to the
adopted language of the Process Patent Act, which limits application
of the grandfather clause to those products "in substantial and contin-
122. Id. § 271. Section 271 provides that the Process Patent Act
shall not abridge or affect the right of any person or any successor in business of such
person to continue to use, sell, or import any specific product already in substantial
and continuous sale or use by such person in the United States on January 1, 1988, or
for which substantial preparation by such person for such sale or use was made
before such date, to the extent equitable for the protection of commercial investments
made or business commenced in the United States before such date. This [grandfa-
ther clause] shall not apply to any person or any successor in business of such person
using, selling, or importing a product produced by a patented process that is the
subject of a process patent enforcement action commenced before January 1, 1987,
before the International Trade Commission, that is pending or in which an order has
been entered.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 765 F. Supp. at 224.
123. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 765 F. Supp. at 224.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 226 (emphasis added).
127. Id.
128. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 765 F. Supp. at 226.
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uous sale or use by such person in the United States." 129 The court
found that the legislative history of this restriction evidenced Con-
gress' intent "to protect persons in the United States, not the foreign
manufacturer of the goods."' 130 The court also cited a Senate Report
which stated:
[T]he primary target of the U.S. process patentholder will natu-
rally be the manufacturer, who is practicing the process and im-
porting the resulting goods in the United States.... In any case,
the Committee does not expect or intend the bill to be used to sue
purchasers of the product, when the infringing manufacturer can
be sued instead.
131
Thus, the court held, the first portion of the grandfather clause ap-
plies only to entities in the United States who are not alleged to be
infringing manufacturers. 3 2 Accordingly, the clause could not pro-
tect Nippon who was an allegedly infringing manufacturer. 33
Nippon also argued that another provision of the grandfather
clause, which concerned the extent of equitable protection available
for "commercial investments made or business commenced in the
United States before such date," applied to its case.' 34 Although Nip-
pon claimed no direct protection under this clause, it asserted that its
customers would be harmed if the court awarded damages against
Nippon.135
To decide this issue, the court weighed the objectives of the Pro-
cess Patent Act as a whole against the specific interests of the grandfa-
ther clause:
The Act's purpose is to protect United States process patentholders
against the infringements of foreign manufacturers who avoid lia-
129. Id.
130. Id. The court also cited testimony of Donald W. Banner, President of Intellectual
Property Owners, Inc., to "explain" the reasoning behind the change in wording:
Maximum incentives for patent owners to manufacture in the United States would be
achieved by deleting the [original wording quoted above]. We see no compelling
reason to allow foreign manufacturers who are currently taking a free ride on the
R&D investments of U.S. process patent owners to be allowed to continue to do so.
If the second sentence is retained, the phrase "commercial production" should be
changed to [the wording adopted by Congress].
Id. (citing Process Patents, 1985: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and
Copyrights of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1985)).
131. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 83, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 39, 47 (1987)).
132. Id.
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bility by applying the process in other countries and selling the
subject goods in the United States. The grandfather clause's pur-
pose is to help the United States companies shift from these often
cheaper, foreign-produced goods to goods produced under the aus-
pices of the Act. Nippon asks me not to apply the Act to them
because they may have to raise the price of the steel they sell. This
price increase will then allegedly harm domestic businesses.
1 3 6
Based on this analysis, the court rejected Nippon's argument that the
potential for economic harm to its United States customers should
protect the alleged foreign infringer under the grandfather clause:
First, Nippon has already contracted with its American purchasers
through June, 1991, so that the only prices that may be affected are
those from July, 1991 to November, 1991 (the patent expires in
December, 1991). Second, Nippon has made no showing that this
potential price increase will harm the domestic businesses in a
manner that would outweigh the benefit of the purpose of the en-
tire Act (protecting the domestic patentholders). Third, Nippon
has not shown that it would even have to increase its prices to the
domestic purchasers for these last few months of the patent's life.
Therefore, I can see little reason to allow Nippon to slip through
prosecution for alleged infringement of a patent by applying a
clause that purports to protect interests in the United States only.
Nippon has not shown that the domestic interests at issue in the
"equitable" clause would be harmed, or at least adversely affected
in such a way as to allow Nippon to avoid liability for alleged pat-
ent infringement.1 37
The court's refusal to apply the grandfather clause in Allegheny
Ludlum Corp. properly recognized that the "harm" to Nippon's cus-
tomers was only a potential increase in the cost of steel. However, the
court's analysis of the grandfather clause was unduly influenced by
notions of domestic industry and United States interests. The narrow
focus of the analysis ignores the possibility, indeed often the
probability, that United States process patents are owned by entities
outside the United States. 38 Courts should apply the protections of
the grandfather clause in a fair and equitable manner to all those with
legitimate expectations of completing specific business transactions in
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. For example, the process patent at issue in Bristol-Myers Co. v. Erbamont Inc., 723
F. Supp. 1038 (D. Del. 1989), dismissed, 734 F. Supp. 661 (D. Del.), and aff'd without opinion,
918 F.2d 186 (Fed. Cir. 1990), was issued to Societa Farmaceutici Italia. Id. at 1039.
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the United States commenced before enactment of the Process Patent
Act.
The Allegheny Ludlum Corp. decision was not the first to con-
strue the scope of Process Patent Act section 271(g). An earlier case,
Bristol-Myers Co. v. Erbamont Inc., 39 illuminates some of the
problems that will undoubtedly arise in the judiciary's construction of
the statute and in importers' attempts to avoid its reach. In Bristol-
Myers Co., the District Court of Delaware considered the question of
what constitutes an "importation." This question required a determi-
nation of whether the goods at issue were "imported" before the effec-
tive date of Process Patent Act section 271(g).140 The case arose
when Bristol-Myers sought a declaratory judgment against Erbamont
and other defendants to invalidate and render unenforceable United
States Patent 3,803,124 (" '124 patent"), which defined and claimed a
process to prepare doxorubicin hydrochloride ("doxorubicin HCL"),
a drug used in the chemotherapeutic treatment of cancer.141
Erbamont filed a counterclaim against Bristol-Myers under section
271(g) of the Process Patent Act for alleged infringement of the '124
patent. 1
42
In December 1987, Bristol-Myers filed an abbreviated new drug
application ("ANDA") with the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA"), seeking approval to import and sell doxorubicin HCL.143
Bristol-Myers indicated in its ANDA that bulk doxorubicin HCL
would be manufactured in Japan, in accordance with a process ap-
proved by the FDA. 44 The FDA approved the doxorubicin HCL
ANDA on April 13, 1989.145
While the FDA was in the process of reviewing the doxorubicin
HCL ANDA, the Japanese manufacturer sent Bristol-Myers two
shipments of bulk doxorubicin HCL, weighing thirteen kilograms in
total. 46 The Japanese manufacturer sent both shipments to Bristol-
Myers' finishing facilities in Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, Foreign Trade
139. 723 F. Supp. 1038 (D. Del. 1989), dismissed, 734 F. Supp. 661 (D. Del.), and aff'd
without opinion, 918 F.2d 186 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
140. Id. Section 271(g) entered into effect on February 23, 1989. See Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act § 9006.
141. Bristol-Myers Co., 723 F. Supp. at 1039.
142. Id. at 1038.
143. Id. at 1039.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Bristol-Myers Co., 723 F. Supp. at 1039. The Japanese manufacturer produced the
bulk doxorubicin HCL by a process the FDA had previously approved. Id. at n.5.
1992]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
Zone 7.147 The shipments arrived at the foreign trade zone in Septem-
ber 1988 and mid-February 1989.148 The bulk chemical "apparently
was warehoused in the custody of the United States Customs Service"
when section 271(g) of the Process Patent Act entered into effect on
February 23, 1989.149 However, Bristol-Myers did not withdraw any
of the thirteen kilograms of bulk doxorubicin HCL from the foreign
trade zone until after February 23, 1989.150 On May 1, 1989, Bristol-
Myers withdrew 1.257 of the 13 kilograms for entry into the United
States,151 and the United States Customs Service assessed duties on
the portion withdrawn that day.
15 2
Erbamont premised its counterclaim for process patent infringe-
ment, under section 271(g) of the Process Patent Act, on Bristol-My-
ers' storage of the thirteen kilograms of bulk doxorubicin HCL in the
foreign trade zone.1 53 In defense, Bristol-Myers argued that it had
"imported" the chemical before section 271(g) became effective, so it
could not be liable as an infringer under that section. 154 Thus, the
heart of the controversy revolved around the meaning of the terms
"importation" and "import" in section 271(g) of the Process Patent
Act. 1 55 The court framed the issue as a simple choice: "If Bristol-
Myers 'imported' the 13 kilograms before the effective date of
§ 271(g) (February 23, 1989), then Erbamont has no cause of action
under this statute. If, however, the 13 kilograms were not 'imported'
until after February 23, 1989, Erbamont could still maintain its action
under § 271(g). ' 156
Erbamont argued that the terms "importation" and "import"
147. Id. at 1039.
148. Id. Further, according to the court:
All 13 kilograms of the doxorubicin hydrochloride had entered the Mayaguez facility
prior to the FDA's approval of the Bristol-Myers ANDA. This bulk doxorubicin
hydrochloride is currently being processed at the Mayaguez facility into individual
vials of lyophilized injectable preparations of powdered doxorubicin hydrochloride.
Bristol-Myers has indicated that sales of these vials containing individual lyophilized
doses of doxorubicin hydrochloride will begin in the near future as permitted by the
terms of Bristol-Myers' recently approved ANDA.
Id. at 1040.
149. Id. at 1039. However, this "appearance" is not necessarily correct. See infra section
IV and accompanying notes.
150. Bristol-Myers Co., 723 F. Supp. at 1039.








meant that the allegedly infringing goods "must have lawfully entered
into United States commerce as opposed to being in custody of Cus-
toms officials."' 57 Bristol-Myers argued to the contrary, contending
that "once the alleged infringing goods entered into the territory of
the United States... this constituted 'importation' under the relevant
provisions of the Act."' 5
8
To resolve this dispute, the court essentially relied on the Black's
Law Dictionary definition of "importation" and agreed with the con-
tention of Bristol-Myers.' 5 9 Black's Law Dictionary defines "importa-
tion" as "[t]he act of bringing goods and merchandise into a country
from a foreign country."' 60 As support for the accuracy of this defini-
tion, Black's Law Dictionary cites the United States Supreme Court
decision in Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon,' 6' which held that im-
portation is the act of "bringing an article into a country from the
outside. If there be an actual bringing in it is importation regardless
of the mode in which it is effected. Entry through a custom house is
not the essence of the act."' 62
The Bristol-Myers Co. court recited that the process of statutory
interpretation begins with the language of the statute itself, and that
judicial inquiry terminates at this point only when the terms of the
statute are unambiguous and no special circumstances exist. 63 With
these fundamental rules, the court held that the terms "importation"
and "import" in section 271(g) of the Process Patent Act had to be
given "their plain [and] ordinary meaning of bringing goods into the
United States from another country."' 64 Accordingly, the court
found that the bulk doxorubicin HCL "was imported-brought into
the United States-prior to the effective date of the statute.' 65 The
court further held that, under the "plain meaning" of the term "im-
portation," Bristol-Myers' receipt of the bulk chemicals in the foreign
157. Id. Erbamont's claim may have been improperly characterized. If the chemical was
in a foreign trade zone, it would have simply been outside the customs territory of the United
States, not necessarily "in the custody" of United States Customs Service officials.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 680 (6th ed. 1990).
161. 262 U.S. 100 (1923).
162. Id. at 122. The Bristol-Myers Co. court also cited Canton R.R. v. Rogan, 340 U.S.
511, 515 (1951) ("to import means to bring into the country"). See Bristol-Myers Co., 723 F.
Supp. at 1043.
163. Bristol-Myers Co., 723 F. Supp. at 1042.
164. Id. at 1044.
165. Id.
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trade zone before the effective date of the statute placed it outside the
reach of section 271(g). 166
The Bristol-Myers Co. court did not discuss the unique status of
foreign trade zones. Rather, the court erroneously interpreted the
phrase "Mayaguez facility" to refer to the city where the foreign trade
zone is located, rather than to refer to the foreign trade zone itself.
The customs territory of the United States includes Puerto Rico. 16 7
However, for revenue purposes, foreign trade zones are considered to
be outside the customs territory of the United States.168 Further,
products inside foreign trade zones cannot be freely sold or distrib-
uted outside of the zone, and activities allowed in foreign trade zones
are severely limited. 169
Congress authorized the creation of foreign trade zones in the
Foreign Trade Zones Act of 1934.170 The Foreign Trade Zones Act,
as amended,' 17 authorizes the Foreign Trade Zones Board to establish
foreign trade zones. 172 Merchandise may be brought into such zones
for any purpose set forth in the statute "without being subject to the
customs laws of the United States"' 173 since it is effectively outside the
general stream of United States commerce.
The thirteen kilograms of bulk doxorubicin HCL at issue in Bris-
tol-Myers Co. were not imported into the customs territory of the
United States, but were sent to a foreign trade zone.174 After section
271(g) of the Process Patent Act went into effect, Bristol-Myers with-
drew 1.257 of the 13 kilograms for entry into the United States, and
the United States Customs Service assessed duties on the withdrawn
chemical that day. 175 The Bristol-Myers Co. court should have found
166. Id. at 1043.
167. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 2333, HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE I
gen. n.2 (1991).
168. See 19 U.S.C. § 81c (1988); Nissan Motor Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 884 F.2d 1375
(Fed. Cir. 1989); Dennis J. Curram, Foreign-Trade Zones Expedite and Encourage Foreign
Commerce, GLOBAL TRADE, Sept. 1988, at 10; Marshall V. Miller, There Is a Reason for
FTZs' Startling Growth: It Makes Good Business Sense, GLOBAL TRADE, Sept. 1988, at 14.
169. See 15 C.F.R. § 400.01 (1990); Nissan Motor Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 12 Ct. Int'l
Trade 737, 738 (1988), aff'd, 884 F.2d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
170. June 18, 1934, ch. 590, § 39, 48 Stat. 999 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 81c);
Nissan Motor Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 884 F.2d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see also Donald E.
deKieffer & George W. Thompson, Political and Policy Dimensions of Foreign Trade Zones:
Expansion or Beginning of the End?, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 481, 492 (1985).
171. 19 U.S.C. §§ 81(a)-(u) (1988).
172. Id.
173. Nissan Motor Mfg. Corp., 884 F.2d at 1375 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 81c).
174. Bristol-Myers Co., 723 F. Supp. at 1039.
175. Id. at 1040-41.
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that entry of the 1.257 kilograms of bulk doxorubicin HCL into the
customs territory of the United States constituted an infringing "im-
portation" because this portion of the doxorubicin HCL entered the
United States after the enactment of section 27 1(g) of the Process Pat-
ent Act.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEFINING "IMPORTATION" UNDER
THE PROCESS PATENT AMENDMENTS ACT
An "importation" for purposes of process patent infringement
should be a formal, identifiable process. The execution of a formal
customs entry is the ideal moment to establish a legal importation for
purposes of process patent infringement. The name of the importer, a
possible future defendant, is provided on the customs entry form, and
related documents, such as invoices and bills of lading, are presented
upon importation. This entry should constitute the official act of "im-
portation." The same information is also available for paperless en-
tries on the automated commercial system.
Merchandise stored in a foreign trade zone or bonded customs
warehouse should not be subject to process patent infringement
claims. 76 This proposed interpretation of section 271(g) is limited to
the storage of protected merchandise, and does not extend to the use
of protected merchandise to manufacture other products. For exam-
ple, an importer may be uncertain of whether a pending importation
infringes a United States process patent. 77 In an exercise of good
faith, the importer might not formally enter the merchandise, but
choose to store it in a foreign trade zone or bonded customs ware-
house to avoid formal entry into the United States. If the method of
making the product is found to infringe a valid United States process
patent, the importer could then re-export the product, without incur-
ring any liability for process patent infringement. Theoretically, the
importer could return the infringing merchandise to the foreign man-
ufacturer for a refund or credit, or ship the infringing merchandise to
a third country where there is no patent infringement. The importer
could also decide to destroy the merchandise rather than defend a suit
for patent infringement.
Under this scenario, the importer should not be held liable for
176. Storage is distinguished from consumption of the merchandise in the foreign trade
zone. See Nissan Motor Mfg. Corp., 884 F.2d at 1377.
177. For instance, the importer may question whether the term of a process patent has
expired.
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making an infringing importation, because the merchandise was
stored in a place where it could be neither sold nor distributed to
others. The merchandise never entered the customs territory of the
United States. The Bristol-Myers Co. v. Erbamont Inc. decision
removes this protection by holding that the term "importation" in
section 271(g) of the Process Patent Act must be accorded its "plain
meaning."
Interestingly, a later decision by the same court used the word
"import," but cautioned that "[t]he Court does not use the term 'im-
port' in the context of § 271(g)." 178 How could this be if the prior
decision held that the term "import" must be given its plain meaning?
Although it amended the Patent Act under title 35 of the United
States Code, the Process Patent Act was part of the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act. 179 The Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act was itself a major piece of legislation, affecting nearly every
aspect of importing to the United States. Therefore, in future cases,
the analysis of the "legislative history" of the Process Patent Act
should consider section 271(g) in the context of the other, contempo-
raneous amendments to the customs and international trade laws.
The massive and comprehensive nature of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act presents a "special circumstance" for courts to
look beyond the plain meaning of technical terms, such as "importa-
tion." Thus, at a minimum, the Bristol-Myers Co. court should have
considered whether the term "importation," as used in the Process
Patent Act, encompasses deliveries to sites outside the customs terri-
tory of the United States where merchandise cannot be freely distrib-
uted or sold.1 80
The Process Patent Act establishes a means for United States
process patent holders to claim monetary damages for infringing im-
portations. Now, consistent with domestic process laws applicable to
patent litigation, process patent holders are entitled to damages ade-
quate to compensate the pecuniary losses sustained due to infringing
importations.' 1 l Although they are difficult to quantify, these dam-
178. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Erbamont Inc., 734 F. Supp. 661, 662 n.3 (D. Del.), aff'd with-
out opinion, 918 F.2d 186 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
179. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
180. This proposal does not extend to consumption in foreign trade zones of merchandise
covered by a valid process patent. See Nissan Motor Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 884 F.2d
1375 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
181. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988); General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648
(1983), aff'g 749 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir.); State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d
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ages generally constitute the difference between the patent holder's
condition after the infringement and what the patent holder's condi-
tion would have been absent the infringing importation.182 However,
in no event should a damage award be less than reasonable
royalties. 183
In typical domestic patent litigation, the patent holder and its
infringer are the only suppliers in the market, and the patent holder
seeks to recover profits lost through every sale made by the in-
fringer.184 However, the definition of the "market" significantly
swells where imports are included. Allegedly infringing imports are
often sold in the country of production as well as other countries be-
yond the United States. Sales outside the United States may not vio-
late any foreign patent laws if the United States patent holder does
not own a valid process patent for that foreign country.1 85 The calcu-
lation of "lost profits" attributable solely to United States sales will
only complicate litigation under section 271(g) of the Process Patent
Act. Indeed, many novel issues will arise as cases develop from each
new application of the Process Patent Act.
1573 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 725 (1990); Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton
Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d
1056, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
182. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964)
(citing Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536, 552 (1886)); Lam, Inc., 718 F.2d at 1064
(citing Aro Mfg. Co., 377 U.S. at 507).
183. State Jndus, Inc., 883 F.2d at 1577 (citing Seattle Box Co. v. Industrial Crating &
Packing Inc., 756 F.2d 1574, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
184. Id. (citing Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 672 (Fed. Cir.
1988); Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 823 F.2d 1538, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Lam, Inc.,
718 F.2d at 1065).
185. Foreign patent laws generally require a patent to be "worked" in the granting coun-
try. For process patents, this usually requires that the process be performed in the granting
country. Thus, working requirements may act as a disincentive to patent abroad, since often
new technology is neither capable of immediate practical application nor economic exploita-
tion, especially in countries lacking the resources to develop the technology. Further, the fail-
ure to work the patent may result in compulsory licensing or forfeiture of the patent.
Therefore, while process patent protection is theoretically available, it may provide only tem-
porary protection until sanctions for failure to work the patent are imposed, or it may force
economically unsound foreign investment decisions. See Murphy, supra note 4, at 287.
Further, foreign patents are often costly and difficult to obtain. Foreign patenting re-
quires specially skilled counsel, extensive paperwork, and costly technical translations. In ad-
dition, foreign countries often demand high maintenance fees after payment of the initial filing
fee, and litigation to defend foreign patents involves costs for special counsel, translations, and
logistical expenses. See id. at 288.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Process Patent Act expanded the scope of patent rights to
include the prohibition of unauthorized uses, sales, and imports of
products made by processes patented in the United States. 8 6 Fur-
ther, the Process Patent Act strengthened the definition of infringe-
ment to encompass any unauthorized sale, use, or importation of the
products of United States-patented processes. 87 The Process Patent
Act also eased the patent holder's burden of proof by establishing a
presumption that products are made by the patented process. 8
The Process Patent Act will undoubtedly reduce access to United
States import markets, "which are the fruits of intellectual property
piracy."' 8 9 This reduced access should, in turn, decrease the United
States' trade deficit.t'° However, the amount of such trade deficit re-
duction directly related to the Process Patent Act will be measurable
only in intangible terms. Even so, the legislative history of the Pro-
cess Patent Act indicates that it was enacted for reasons other than
the reduction of the United States' trade deficit.
Litigation under section 271(g) of the Process Patent Act may be
the more desirable method of enforcing United States process patent
rights, because it lacks the time pressures and perceived procedural
unfairness identified by the GATT panel's analysis before the ITC of
Tariff Act section 337 proceedings. There is, of course, no finding
that section 271(g) of the Process Patent Act violates the United
States' obligations under the GATT, nor are any proceedings under-
way to declare section 271(g) violative of the GATT. The procedural
protections and equality of treatment generally available in federal
district court should effectively address the concerns raised by the
GATT panel in its analysis of section 337.
From the standpoint of a United States process patent holder-a
party who may or may not be located in the United States-the new
186. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act § 9002 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 154); Mur-
phy, supra note 4, at 291.
187. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act § 9003 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 271); Mur-
phy, supra note 4, at 291.
188. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act § 9005 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 295). As
discussed supra at the text accompanying notes 119 and 120, this presumption is conditional
because for it to apply, a court must find a "substantial likelihood" that the product was made
by the patented process, and conclude that the patent holder "made a reasonable effort to
determine the process actually used in the production of the product and was unable to so
determine." Id.
189. Murphy, supra note 4, at 298.
190. See id.
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in personam judicial proceedings under section 271(g) of the Process
Patent Act are in many ways superior to the in rem exclusion orders
available from the ITC under section 337 of the Tariff Act. From the
standpoint of an importer, however, section 271 (g) of the Process Pat-
ent Act presents unexpected perils, because liability for "importing"
infringing items may attach in future cases, even when the "im-
ported" merchandise never enters the customs territory of the United
States. Hopefully, these perils will be mitigated in future decisions
that interpret the scope and proper applications of the Process Patent
Act.

